[ic] New SecureProtect directive to prevent sidejacking

Peter peter at pajamian.dhs.org
Sat Oct 30 23:10:32 UTC 2010

On 31/10/10 01:56, Mike Heins wrote:
> Quoting Peter (peter at pajamian.dhs.org):
>> On 30/10/10 17:13, Mike Heins wrote:
>>> Quoting Peter (peter at pajamian.dhs.org):
>>>> Why do we need to limit it to logged in users?  Why can't we protect
>>>> secure pages in the session before someone is logged in?
>>> Nothing stops you from generating your own MV_SHASH via another
>>> process. Feel free.
>>> But what information would you base the hashing on? We can't use IP
>>> address or MAC address, if they are sniffing. Session keys are kind of
>>> pointless -- if you did that you would only be protected on
>>> the *second* page. What's the point?
>> What about just a random token stored in the session itself?  If the
>> secure cookie has the wrong token or non-existent then secure access is
>> denied.
> That prevents the multi-day de-authentication scheme.

Oh, I see, you're mixing session protection with cookie login.  I'm not
sure that these should be combined as it seems to over-complicate
things.  What's wrong with just protecting the session and then making
the login cookie secure?  This would seem to be a much simpler approach,
would allow sessions to be protected regardless of login state and still
allows for automated login with cookies.

>>> And why would you put secure information in a session before someone
>>> authenticates? In normal operation, you don't want to use SSL, and
>>> why waste CPU cycles on a random non-authenticated user?
>> Someone can go right through to checkout without logging in, and even
>> complete checkout as a "guest" (albeit with an implicit login).
>> Certainly a good deal of data can be accumulated just from the browsing
>> habits of the user, what items they add to their cart, etc. before they
>> login.  On a multi-page checkout there is even personal telephone and
>> address data that is stored and can be retrieved, and all before the
>> customer has to login.
> That type of behavior doesn't make them a target for sidejacking.

I can imagine some scenarios where it is ... stalking for instance, but
regardless, who are we to say what personal data is worth protecting to
someone and what is not?


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